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What explains the variations in military outcomes and the magnitude of civilian costs during 
civilian displacement operations? Although forceful displacement (or relocation) of civilians has 
been prohibited by international humanitarian law in the post-World War II era, the tactic has 
continuously been employed as an integral counter-insurgency (COIN) measure, as it is widely 
believed to be effective in cutting off insurgent support.1 According to a survey of COIN 
operations between 1945 and 2000, it was employed in 22 out of the 47 cases observed.2 
      Despite its widespread use, civilian displacement tactic has yet to receive a thorough 
treatment within the existing literature. Not until recently have scholars started to distinguish the 
notion of civilian displacement from mass killing, as the concepts have often been discussed 
interchangeably within the broad term of ‘draining the sea’.3 Moreover, studies that consider 
displacement a distinct type of violence have not analyzed the varying level of civilian costs in 
such operations, assuming the tactic to be inherently violent.4 Yet, civilian displacement does not 
necessarily entail extreme brutality and the outcome has historically been mixed. To better 
forecast and reduce civilian casualties during low-intensity conflicts, it is imperative to analyze 
the conditions under which displacement operations are conducted less violently while denying 
insurgent support.  
 
1 Yuri Zhukov, ‘Population Resettlement in War: Theory and Evidence from Soviet Archives’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 59/7 (2015), 1156-7. 
2 Stephen Pampinella, ‘The Effectiveness of Coercive and Persuasive Counterinsurgency Practices since 1945’, Civil 
Wars, 17/4 (2015), 503-26. 
3 Alexander Downes, ‘Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate 
Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy’, Civil Wars, 9/4 (2007), 420-44; and Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and 
Dylan Balch-Lindsay, ‘‘Draining the Sea’: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare’, International Organization, 58/2 
(2004), 375-407. 
4 Kelly Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2010); Abbey Steele, ‘Electing Displacement: Political Cleansing in Apartadó, Colombia’, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55/3 (2011), 423-45; and Zhukov, ‘Population Resettlement in War’. 
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     Here, we focus on the organisational characteristics of COIN forces, namely, force 
integration, to explain the military outcomes and civilian costs of displacement operations. For a 
government whose aims are to restore internal stability and garner legitimacy, an operation is 
most successful when it cuts insurgent supplies while minimising civilian victimisation. 
However, soldiers do not necessarily abide by this goal due to the principal-agent problem within 
military organisations. We argue that a stable and durable command structure, the close 
supervision of forces, and the quality of personnel are the key factors that promote an integrated 
use of force and ultimately result in a militarily successful but less violent operation.  
     The relationship between force integration and the outcome of displacement operations, 
however, is not simply linear. From the military vantage point, an improvement in force 
integration is highly likely to result in success, as tighter control by commanders better motivates 
soldiers to pursue military goals, i.e. the removal of civilians from insurgent areas. In terms of 
civilian costs, however, moderately integrated forces can cause greater damage than poorly 
integrated ones. While soldiers in the latter may victimise civilians mostly for small-scale 
exploitative motives, those in the former, who are more motivated to achieve the strategic goals, 
can be incentivised to perpetrate mass killing as an “easy” way to carry out the operation. This 
risk of perpetrating mass killing is only reduced when an army is highly integrated and is 
therefore able to regulate the use of violence meticulously. 
     To evaluate our theory, three case studies of major counter-guerrilla operations conducted by 
the newly-independent South Korean government against communist guerrillas (1948-1953) are 
analyzed. Utilising a wealth of primary documents produced by government forces and 
guerrillas, oral history records, and truth commission reports, we examine the relationship 
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between the level of integration of the Korean security forces, and the magnitude of damage 
inflicted on the guerrillas and civilians during relocation operations.  
     The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section presents our argument 
on force integration during displacement operations. In the following sections, we examine three 
operations before and during the Korean War: the Jeju Island Uprising (Phases 1 and 2), and 
operations by the Eleventh Division and Task Force Paik in Chiri Mountain. The broader 
scholarly and policy-relevant implications are discussed in the concluding section. 
 
Force Integration in Civilian Displacement 
‘Draining the sea’ has been widely employed as a key COIN tactic. When faced with internal 
threats, a victory by military means alone is difficult to achieve since it is challenging to gather 
information on insurgents, who remain nearly indistinguishable from noncombatants.5 Thus, 
states often simultaneously focus on civilians, a visible target, and relocate them away from 
insurgent-active zones to undermine the enemy’s capabilities.6 Operating without their own 
means of production, insurgents lose significant capabilities when separated from civilians. In 
other words, this tactic aims to drain the ‘sea’ to catch the ‘fish’.7 
    While both civilian displacement and mass killing have been broadly termed ‘draining the 
sea’, as both measures serve to eliminate the entire population from an area,8 recent studies have 
 
5 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, ‘How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict’, International Security, 26/1 
(2001), 93-128; Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006); and Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, ‘Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency 
Wars’, International Organization, 63/1 (2009), 67-106. 
6 Jacqueline Hazelton, ‘The “Hearts and Minds” Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency 
Warfare’, International Security, 42/1 (2017), 89-91; Steele, ‘Electing Displacement’; and Zhukov, ‘Population 
Resettlement in War’. 
7 Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare (Courier Corporation, 2005). 
8 Downes, ‘Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves’; and Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay, ‘‘Draining the Sea’’. 
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started to treat displacement as a distinct type of political violence. Scholars point out that 
displacement tactics are more likely to be utilised when distinguishing rebels from the population 
is difficult or when civilians are deemed insurgent supporters.9 Little is known, however, 
regarding the effectiveness of the tactic itself. Although some studies demonstrate the military 
utility of displacement tactics,10 few systematically analyze the conditions under which the 
displacement tactic can be more effective.11 
    Furthermore, by conceptualising the tactic as being inherently violent, the literature does not 
address the variance in civilian costs. The tactic is indeed violent since it entails coercing 
civilians to relocate away from conflict zones. Yet, as demonstrated during British COIN 
operations in Kenya and Malaya, the same tactic can result in different degrees of civilian 
casualties.12 
      Lastly, most studies on civilian displacement exclusively focus on the strategic function of 
violence; based on the rationalist and unitary actor framework, the use of violence in civilian 
displacement operations is assumed to be fully dedicated towards undermining insurgent 
support.13 That is, all instances of violence perpetrated during displacement operations are 
assumed to be consistent with the state’s aims. Although parsimonious, such assumptions are not 
 
9 Kelly Greenhill, ‘Strategic Engineered Migration as a Weapon of War’, Civil Wars, 10/1 (2008), 6–21; Greenhill, 
Weapons of Mass Migration; Steele, ‘Electing Displacement’; Abbey Steele, Democracy and Displacement in 
Colombia’s Civil War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017); and Zhukov, ‘Population Resettlement in War’. 
10 Alexander Downes, Targeting Civilians in War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), ch.5. 
11 Zhukov concludes that large-scale displacement is more effective than smaller ones. Zhukov, ‘Population 
Resettlement in War’, 1173. 
12 Karl Hack, ‘The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 32/3 
(2009), 412. 
13 Downes, ‘Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves’; Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration; Steele, ‘Electing 
Displacement’; and Zhukov, ‘Population Resettlement in War’. 
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necessarily valid during internal conflicts, in which governments have a tenuous hold of the state 
apparatus, including the military organisation.14 
     An alternative approach that can address this unexplored dimension is the principal-agent 
framework. By relaxing the unitary actor assumption, recent works have concentrated on the 
internal aspect of military organisations – including ideological commitment, social bonds, and 
discipline – to explain the use of violence that is inconsistent with the rational objectives of 
states.15 Thus far, however, no systematic endeavor has been devoted to applying this framework 
to the use of violence in civilian displacement operations.  
     Here, we adopt the principal-agent framework to explain both military outcomes and civilian 
costs during displacement operations. Our theory focuses on the different incentive structures 
facing state leaders and high-level commanders (principals), and the junior officers and soldiers 
(agents). When employing draining-the-sea tactics, the principal’s primary aim is to undermine 
insurgent support by relocating civilians from their access. At the same time, the principals also 
have incentives to minimise the use of violence since high civilian casualties come with the risk 
of losing domestic and international reputation, and potential outside intervention.16 Moreover, 
 
14 Hanne Fjelde and Indra De Soysa, ‘Coercion, Co-Optation, or Cooperation? State Capacity and the Risk of Civil 
War, 1961—2004’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 26/1 (2009), 5–25. 
15 Dara Kay Cohen, ‘Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009)’, American Political 
Science Review, 107/3 (2013), 461-77; Amelia Hoover Green, ‘The Commander’s Dilemma: Creating and 
Controlling Armed Group Violence’, Journal of Peace Research, 53/5 (2016), 619-32; Devorah Manekin, ‘The 
Limits of Socialization and the Underproduction of Military Violence: Evidence from the IDF’, Journal of Peace 
Research, 54/5 (2017), 606-19; and Kai Thaler, ‘Ideology and Violence in Civil Wars: Theory and Evidence from 
Mozambique and Angola’, Civil Wars, 14/4 (2012), 546-67. 
16 Steele, ‘Electing Displacement’, 46-47. Consistent with our logic, recent studies indicate that civilian damage 
inflicted by COIN forces undermine government support while increasing insurgent backing. Luke Condra and 
Jacob Shapiro, ‘Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects of Collateral Damage’, American Journal of Political 
Science, 56/1 (2012), 167–87; and Jason Lyall, Graeme Blair and Kosuke Imai, ‘Explaining Support for Combatants 
during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan’, American Political Science Review, 107/4 (2013), 679-705. 
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unless state leaders have a genocidal aim, committing large-scale violence undermines the 
government’s long-term interests since civilians are sources of tax, manpower, and sovereignty.17      
     While the principal’s aim is to relocate civilians with minimal casualties, troops on the 
battleground often operate with different incentives. On one hand, factors such as fear of or 
sympathy for the insurgents and psychological unpreparedness to utilise violence can make 
soldiers avoid orders.18 On the other hand, soldiers may perpetrate unauthorised violence for 
self-serving reasons, including material and sexual benefits.19 Thus, civilian displacement 
operations can either fail to achieve its military goal or cause arbitrary civilian casualties when 
lower-level units do not closely align with the overall aims of the operation. 
     Given the rifts between principals and agents, government forces are less likely to achieve 
optimal outcomes without a considerable organisational capacity. We argue that the outcome of 
relocation operations is influenced by the level of integration of government forces (or force 
integration).20 We specifically concentrate on three attributes: the stability and durability of the 
command structure; monitoring efforts by commanding officers; and the quality of personnel. 
     First, command structure refers to the unity and durability of the command upon which all 
members of an army organisation agree.21 Without a clearly defined chain of command, different 
actors inside the establishment can undermine the unity of effort, as each have incentives to push 
 
17 Mancur Olson, ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’, American Political Science Review, 87/3 (1993), 
567-76. 
18 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (New York: Back 
Bay, 1995). 
19 John Mueller, ‘The Banality of “Ethnic War”’, International Security, 25/1 (2000), 42-70. 
20 Integration is defined as a capability of an army that ensures consistent military activity across ranks. We 
specifically focus on the operational and tactical level of integration. Risa Brooks, ‘Introduction: The Impact of 
Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness’, in Risa Brooks and Elizabeth 
Stanley (eds.), Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2007), 10; and Allan Millett, Williamson Murray and Kenneth Watman, ‘The Effectiveness of Military 
Organizations’, International Security, 11/1 (1986), 37-71. 
21 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing 
Threat and Response (Carlisle: Army War College, 2004), 32-3. 
8 
 
costs toward the other while claiming credit for successes.22 Meanwhile, durability enables 
commanding officers to establish full control over their lower-level units by building 
relationships. That is, soldiers are more incentivised to follow orders from a long-tenured 
commander, considering their future interactions with their superior.23 
     Second, monitoring (or information management) refers to efforts made by commanders to 
supervise their lower-level units in action.24 Information asymmetry exists between commanders 
and soldiers, as operations are mostly conducted out of view of the former. Taking advantage of 
this, the rank and file may refuse to bear the costs of the operation (i.e., avoid engaging in battle) 
or seek to gain arbitrary benefits (i.e., looting civilians or colluding with the enemy). Such 
unauthorised actions can be controlled by commanders’ efforts to maintain communication with 
their units during operations via messengers, radio, and GPS devices. 
     Third, the quality of personnel covers intangible aspects of military organisations, such as 
loyalty, morale, and proficient use of weapons, that contribute to a coherent operation.25 
Relevant factors are recruitment, and training and combat experience. An army’s capability to 
operate as a coherent group is affected by its recruitment process, particularly its ability to weed 
out incompetent or disloyal soldiers.26 In addition, training regimens contribute to cohesiveness 
 
22 Kristin Bakke, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham and Lee Seymour, ‘A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, 
Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars’, Perspectives on Politics, 10/2 (2012), 265-83; Brooks, ‘Introduction’, 21-2; 
Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 4-
6; and Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2015), 14. 
23 Robert Axelrod and William Hamilton, ‘The Evolution of Cooperation’, Science, 211/4489 (1981), 1390–6. 
24 Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army, 14. 
25 Anthony King, The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twentieth-First 
Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 266-300; Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army, 13-4; Joseph Felter, 
‘Sources of Military Effectiveness in Counterinsurgency: Evidence from the Philippines’, in Dan Reiter (ed.), The 
Sword’s Other Edge: Trade-offs in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017), 134; and Pollack, Arabs at War, 9. 
26 Paul Gill and John Horgan, ‘Who Were the Volunteers? The Shifting Sociological and Operational Profile of 




by preparing the recruits technically and psychologically to use violence as well as by socialising 
individual soldiers into their units.27 Alternatively, soldiers can also develop their proficiency 
through actual battle experience. In a nutshell, well-selected and trained (or experienced) soldiers 
are more capable and willing to conduct operations as directed.  
     Putting it together, variations in force integration can lead to one of three outcomes during 
relocation operations. First, when force integration is lacking (LOW), relocation operations are 
likely to result in military failure and unsystematic civilian casualties. With low organisational 
capacity, it is challenging for commanders to be updated on the most basic information, such as 
troop movement and after-action results. Without any meaningful control from above, soldiers 
are likely to ignore operational orders to avoid the risk of guerrilla counterattacks and instead 
engage in arbitrary activities. Civilians near operation areas thus become vulnerable to violence 
by soldiers with exploitative aims. However, the scale of civilian casualties is unlikely to escalate 
into systematic killing, defined as an act or attempt to eliminate the entire population in a given 
location. This is because violence here is driven by individual motives that are not necessarily 
strongly shared by all soldiers to commit murder.  
     Next, when there is an intermediate level of force integration (MEDIUM), a relocation 
operation is likely to be militarily successful but with systematic, large-scale civilian casualties. 
Commanders can observe and assess troop movement and operational outcomes but still lack the 
sophisticated capabilities needed to manage the process of operations in detail. Knowing that the 
outcome of the operation will later be evaluated by the commanders, soldiers are better 
 
Thomas Hegghammer, ‘The Recruiter’s Dilemma: Signaling and Rebel Recruitment Tactics’, Journal of Peace 
Research, 50/1 (2013), 3–16; and Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, ‘Handling and Manhandling 
Civilians in Civil War’, American Political Science Review, 100/3 (2006), 429–47. 
27 Grossman, On Killing, 251-63; and Hew Strachan, ‘Training, Morale and Modern War’, Journal of Contemporary 
History, 41/2 (2006), 211-27. 
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incentivised to remove civilians from the target area. Given the considerable power gap between 
the security forces and civilians, the elimination of the civilian population per se can be easily 
achieved.  
     During the process, however, civilians are more likely to fall prey to mass killing. The very 
nature of uprooting civilians creates more opportunities for violence, as coercive measures are 
often employed. Furthermore, given the costs associated with civilian relocation (i.e., logistical 
and transportation costs and vulnerability to potential guerrilla attacks), junior officers and 
soldiers, even those without exploitative aims, can develop new situation-induced incentives to 
target as a ‘quick and safer’ way to accomplish the order. Others, driven by predatory aims, can 
take advantage of this violent situation. That is, while violence by a low-integrated army is 
mostly driven by personal motives alone, civilian victimisation by a moderately integrated 
military is motivated by both strategic and personal motives. Without sophisticated 
organisational capacity, detecting and preventing such acts is demanding for commanders. For 
example, utilising the practical indistinguishability between insurgents and civilians, lower-level 
units can easily make false claims that targeted civilians are enemies killed. 
     Lastly, relocation operations conducted by highly integrated forces (HIGH) are likely to be 
militarily successful while keeping civilian costs minimal. The rank and file is highly unlikely to 
avoid operation orders or use arbitrary violence when commanders are capable of evaluating 
both the outcome and process of operations.  
     In all, we suggest nuanced mechanisms that link the level of the integration of COIN forces 
and the outcome of displacement operations (see Table 1). When lacking force integration, a 
displacement operation is unlikely to damage the insurgents’ support base, as soldiers refuse to 
follow orders to avoid risks. At the same time, members with predatory aims are likely to 
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perpetrate arbitrary violence, causing considerable yet unsystematic civilian costs. When 
government forces are medium-integrated, soldiers are more likely to be committed to operations 
under the tighter control. This increased commitment of soldiers, however, can introduce new 
strategic incentives on top of the existing exploitative aims to perpetrate mass killing as a quick 
and safe way to meet operational objectives. Thus, an operation will be militarily successful yet 
most violent when conducted by a moderately integrated army. A relocation operation is likely to 
be militarily successful and least violent when it is carried out by high-integrated forces.  
 
<INSERT TABLE I HERE> 
 
Case Selection, Method, and Research Scope 
To test our argument, we conduct in-depth case studies of three South Korean counter-guerrilla 
operations: operation to suppress the Jeju Uprising, Phases 1 (May-October 1948) and 2 
(October 1948-February 1949); operation by the Eleventh Division (October 1950-March 1951); 
and the operation by Task Force Paik (December 1951-March 1952). Having been active for 
more than year in Jeju Island and Chiri Mountain and maintaining large spheres of influence 
during their respective periods, the three cases represent the most significant campaigns among 
numerous counter-guerrilla operations conducted in South Korea in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Countering them was thus critical in restoring political order in South Korea.28 
 
<INSERT FIGURE I HERE> 
 
 
28 The Yeosu-Sooncheon Mutiny of 1948, another significant event during this period, is excluded since it was more 
of a conventional battle between the rebel and government forces. 
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     We perform structured, focused comparison based on evidence gathered from archival 
documents, oral history records, and truth commission reports.29 Given several shared 
characteristics, the cases are ideal for observing the impact of force integration on both military 
outcomes and civilian costs. First, despite differences in the origins of the conflicts, the 
guerrillas, lacking their own means, primarily relied on the local population for supplies. Second, 
most guerrilla activities took place in comparably mountainous terrain of Mount Halla in Jeju 
and the Chiri Mountain range. Third, all three cases relied heavily on civilian displacement 
tactics. Fourth, other variables such as regime type, state capacity and ethnicity are held constant 
across the cases.30 Lastly, the Korean cases are particularly puzzling as they meet the key 
conditions under which displacement is identified to be most effective but still demonstrate a 
sharp variation in outcomes.31  
     To operationalise force integration, we focus on the following criteria. We measure the three 
attributes separately and then merge them into one overall measurement of force integration. The 
command structure is marked high when the military had a unified and durable line of command. 
Conversely, command structure is measured as medium (and low) if either unification or 
durability of command (or both) was lacking. Monitoring is measured as high when operational 
commanders made systematic efforts to supervise their units. If such efforts are not evident, we 
measure monitoring for such cases as low. We mark quality of personnel as being high if 
 
29 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005). 
30 Brooks, ‘Introduction’; Michael Desch, Power and Military Effectiveness the Fallacy of Democratic 
Triumphalism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration; Jason 
Lyall, ‘Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy’s Impact on War Outcomes and 
Duration’, International Organization, 64/1 (2010), 167–92; and Zhukov, ‘Population Resettlement in War’. 
31 The conditions for effective civilian displacement tactic are: 1) limited geographic scope of insurgency; 2) isolated 
insurgents; 3) small local civilian population; and 4) civilians sympathetic towards insurgents. In all three cases, the 
insurgents were pinched into remote mountainous areas, isolated from external support, and the size of the local 
population in battle zones was small. Downes, ‘Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves’, 438-40. 
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government forces were recruited through a solid system and seasoned through coherent training 
or ample battle experience. If one or both aspects were lacking, it is marked as medium and low, 
respectively.  
     Next, we determine the overall measurement of force integration during each case. Force 
integration is low when two of the three attributes grade as low while the remaining one is 
medium or lower. Conversely, high force integration results when two attributes grade as high 
and the other one grades as medium or higher. All other cases that fall between the two are 
categorised as medium. 
     To evaluate the performance of civilian displacement operations, we focus on two specific 
outcomes: 1) damage inflicted on the insurgent supply lines; and 2) civilian casualties inflicted 
by government forces. For the first part, we analyse how the employment of civilian 
displacement tactics impacted guerrillas’ supply of daily necessities, using internal documents 
and testimonies. An operation is considered successful if the evidence indicates negative changes 
occurring to guerrilla supplies following the operation.  
     As for civilian costs, we first discuss the overall patterns of government-perpetrated violence, 
including the number of civilian victims. We then examine evidence regarding the incidence of 
the systematic killing of civilians. An event of violence is considered systematic when soldiers 
attempted to target the entirety of the community. 
     Lastly, we briefly examine several rival explanations, such as the balance of power between 
insurgents and COIN forces, implementation of civil operations to win ‘hearts and minds’ of the 
population, geographical scope, and involvement of external actors.32 We discuss how these 
 
32 Jacqueline DeMerrit, ‘Delegating Death: Military Intervention and Government Killing’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 59/3 (2015), 428-54; David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 1964); and Reed Wood, ‘Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence Against Civilians’, Journal of Peace 
Research, 47/5 (2010), 601-14. 
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factors contributed to the operational outcome at the end of our study in order to compare their 
explanatory power against our own. As for the research scope, our theory can travel to other 
types of insurgencies as long as the incumbent intends to embrace all members of the society as 
part of their future population but is not applicable to governments with dispossessive aims, such 
as genocidal or secessionist motives.33 
 
The South Korean Campaign: Case Studies 
Jeju Island Uprising  
The Jeju Uprising was the first organised armed resistance against the nascent South Korean 
regime after its independence. On 3 April, 1948, approximately 500 poorly-armed insurgents 
organised by the South Korean Labor Party’s (SKLP) Jeju Chapter initiated an island-wide 
attack on the police and right-wingers.34 As initial attempts by the Korean National Police (KNP) 
and local Korean Constabulary (KC) units, the forerunner of the Republic of Korea Army 
(ROKA), were unsuccessful, the United States Army Military Government in Korea 
(USAMGIK) initiated a large-scale operation in May 1948 that lasted a full year. We focus on 
the campaign between mid-May 1948 and February 1949, during which civilian displacement 
was consistently employed. Specifically, we divide the case into two phases, before and after 
mid-October 1948, given that the scope of displacement, which had been conducted 
unsystematically initially, evolved into a full-scale operation by that point. 
     The Eleventh (3,045 personnel led by Col. Jin-kyung Park and Lt. Col. Gyeongrok Choi, 15 
May-24 July, 1948), the Ninth (2,112, Lt. Col. Yo-chan Song, 15 July-29 December, 1948), and 
 
33 Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration, 14-5. 
34 Jeju People’s Guerrillas (JPG), ‘Combat Report’, in Changsong Moon (ed.), Hallasaneun Algoitda: Mutyeojin 
4.3ui Jinsang [Halla Mountain Witnessed: The Hidden Truth of the 4.3 Incident] (Jeju: Dealim, 1995), 16-86. 
15 
 
the Second (2,622, Lt. Col. Byung-sun Ham, after 29 December, 1948) Regiments spearheaded 
the Jeju operations with 1,700 KNP forces playing auxiliary roles, making the government-
insurgent balance of power 9.4:1 (Phase 1) and 8.6:1 (Phase 2). 35 Throughout the entire 
operation, government forces relied heavily on civilian displacement tactics. First, detention 
camps were constructed in coastal areas to uproot the civilians from active-insurgency zones in 
the mountain areas. Second, sweeping operations were conducted around the Halla Mountain 
region to destroy the insurgents and their strongholds. Third, screening centers were created to 
identify suspected leftists among the islanders.36 Civil operations were attempted by the Second 
Regiment in early January 1949 but were quickly discontinued after the guerrillas initiated a 
massive assault against the government forces and civilians.37 The US exercised control over the 
operation throughout, initially as the military government and later indirectly via military 
advisors after the establishment of Republic of Korea in August 1948.38 The operation area was 
approximately 1,800 km2. 
 
1) Phase One 
Immediately after its assignment, the Eleventh Regiment started to separate civilians from the 
insurgents by building stone walls around villages and relocating them to detention camps in the 
 
35 ‘Constitutional Assembly Record, 124th session, December 8, 1948’, in The National Investigation Committee for 
the Jeju 4.3 Incident (National Committee) (ed.), 4.3 Document Collection 4 (Seoul: National Committee, 2002), 
105; and ‘USAGIK, G-2 Periodic Report No. 1097’, in National Committee (ed.), 4.3 Collection 7 (Seoul: National 
Committee, 2002), 123. 
36 John Merrill, ‘The Cheju-Do Rebellion’, Journal of Korean Studies, 2 (1980), 175; and Hugh Deane, The Korean 
War 1945-1953 (San Francisco: China Books & Periodicals, 1999), 58. 
37 ‘USAGIK, G-2 Periodic Report No. 1097’, 117-25. 
38 ‘Brig. Gen. William Roberts to Lee Bum Suk, September 29, 1948’, in 4.3 Collection 7, 116-7; and Robert 
Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington: Center of Military History, 1988), 34. 
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coastal areas.39 The tactic would continue with the Ninth Regiment as an estimated 5,000 
islanders were relocated within the first month and a half of the operation.40  
     During this phase, force integration of the KC was weak in every aspect (LOW). The 
command structure was divided between the constabulary and police, and suffered from abrupt 
changes of commanders.41 Between May and June 1948, Col. Rothwell Brown, Commander of 
the U.S. 20th Regiment, briefly exercised unified command over the KC, police, and US 
intelligence and advising units.42 After his departure, however, no US or KC senior officer 
assumed the role, which suggests that the KC and KNP returned to their separate command 
chains. Furthermore, leadership changes persisted within the Jeju Defense Headquarters (JDHQ). 
To facilitate the operation, KC Headquarters established the JDHQ on 11 October, 1948, and  
Col. Sang-gyeom Kim again was given unified command over the constabulary, police, and 
naval units in Jeju.43 However, Kim was replaced by Lt. Col. Song within eight days, after the 
Yeo-Soon Mutiny was started by the Fourteenth Regiment under his command.44 Durability of 
command was further undermined with the assassination of Col. Park by a group of insurgent-
sympathisers within the KC. 
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     Phase 1 of the operation also exposed a lack of monitoring of their units by KC commanders. 
The KC employed members of right-wing youth groups, such as the Northwest Youth 
Association (Seobuk Chungnyundan, NKYA), as ‘elite’ companies that did not belong within the 
regular military structure.45 Moreover, other KC ranking officers and the military police could 
not intervene in the groups’ activities due to Lt. Col. Song’s orders ‘(to) not touch the special 
company’.46 Employing special units is not unusual during military operations. However, 
without close institutional control, the use of such groups with anti-communist grievances and 
poor military training led to an arbitrary use of violence. 
     In addition, the government forces suffered from the low quality of personnel due to problems 
in recruitment and training. Lacking a selective recruitment system during its early years, 
multiple communist cells had infiltrated the KC.47 As discussed later, these elements would 
seriously sabotage operations in various ways. As for training, soldiers of the Eleventh Regiment 
had only received the basic five-day training.48 The Ninth Regiment was deployed to Jeju ‘for 
field training’ by the USAMGIK on the assumption that the insurgency would be suppressed 
easily.49 Without a solid training program, the burgeoning Korean army had to utilise the 
insurgency as an opportunity for military experience. 
     The military outcome for Phase 1 was a failure. The guerrillas continued to collect supplies 
from civilians, while avoiding direct engagement with the KC.50 Moreover, insurgent-
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sympathisers within the constabulary exposed the operation in various ways, including 
communication with the guerrillas and islanders, and even firing blank shots during operations.51 
Since many civilians were able to flee before operations, a large proportion of those brought to 
the detention camps were young children and elders, perhaps the least valuable sources of supply 
for the insurgents.52 KC deserters continuously provided the guerrillas with much-needed 
manpower, weapons, and ammunition.53 The operation was further marred by the assassination 
of Col. Park. Not only did the loss of the commander interrupt the pace of operation54 but 
suspicions of locally recruited KC soldiers also grew. Subsequently, they were placed in separate 
units that were seldom committed to operations, significantly reducing the strength of the 
constabulary.  
     Regarding civilian costs, Phase 1 operations saw cases of arbitrary, yet non-systematic 
violence. The official investigative committee of the uprising estimates that approximately 980 
civilians were killed by government forces during this phase.55 While this casualty number was 
by no means inconsequential, it was significantly smaller in scale than the estimated 6,500 killed 
during Phase 2. A multi-year investigation by a newspaper, Jemin Ilbo, includes numerous 
instances of exploitative violence during Phase 1, yet no attempts to destroy an entire community 
were reported.56  
 
1) Phase Two 
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It was during Phase 2 that the KC conducted fully-fledged civilian displacement operations. 
Starting 20 October, areas 5 km inland from the coastline were declared forbidden territory. With 
the coastal areas protected by the police, the KC was committed to relocating the remaining 
civilians and fighting guerrilla forces. The constabulary burned down approximately 40,000 
houses in 300 villages in the mid-mountain areas of Jeju and relocated locals to the coastal areas 
fortified with stone walls.57  
     During Phase 2, the integration of government forces improved to intermediate level 
(MEDIUM). Command structure became more coherent and without sudden disruptions after the 
consolidation of command by Lt. Col. Song in mid-October. However, evidence suggests that 
the command structure was still not completely clarified. At the top-level, it is unclear whether 
the JDHQ continued to function as a solid command center after the departure of Lt. Col. Song. 
No available material indicates whether Lt. Col. Ham assumed command of the headquarters 
from Song or whether the JDHQ was officially dissolved at all. This suggests a possibility that 
the headquarters functioned as an ad hoc structure and was disregarded without any official 
closure. In addition, a temporally divided chain of command existed within the lower ranks.58 
Each battalion under the Second Regiment had two commanders assigned, one for battle and the 
other for administration, and their relationship is difficult to assess based on available evidence.59 
Given that this arrangement was neither specified in the ROKA table of organisation nor adopted 
again after this specific period, it is doubtful whether such a divided command contributed to the 
integration of COIN forces. 
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     Force monitoring by KC commanders during Phase 2 remained problematic. As discussed, Lt. 
Col. Song allowed right-wing youth groups to operate outside the regular chain of command, and 
this pattern continued with the Second Regiment.60 Anecdotal evidence indicates similar 
problems prevailed even within regular KC units. For example, interviews conducted by the 
Institute for Military History recorded an instance in which a KC company commander went to a 
local tavern during the operation rather than leading his unit.61  
     The quality of personnel for Phase 2 demonstrated a moderate improvement. Still lacking a 
sophisticated training system, under-qualified individuals, such as NKYA members, were 
accepted to the constabulary.62 However, after purging alleged enemy infiltrators within its own 
ranks by November 1948, the KC did not suffer from internal sabotage of operations. The 
Second Regiment, moreover, was relatively more experienced since it had participated in the 
operation against the Yeo-Soon Mutiny before arriving in Jeju.  
     In terms of military outcome, Phase 2 of the operation was a success. With a relatively 
solidified line of command and more loyal troops, the constabulary conducted operations in a 
more thorough manner. Weeding out internal-sympathisers detrimentally cut insurgents’ access 
to supplies and information from the constabulary. Testimonies of islanders indicate that the 
operation in late 1948 and early 1949 was the watershed moment that undermined the insurgents’ 
supply lines.63 As many villages were destroyed, insurgents were forced to visit distant coastal 
areas and relied on more coercive measures to acquire food. This exacerbated situation is more 
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pronounced when the nature of insurgent violence is compared between Phases 1 and 2. While 
the insurgents mostly killed selected targets (government officials and right-wing figures) during 
Phase 1, most cases of violence in Phase 2 were perpetrated while collecting food against 
islanders assigned to guard the coastal villages.64 In other words, the insurgents were no longer 
able to freely enter villages and had to risk damaging their relationship with the locals in order to 
obtain supplies.  
     Despite the successful military outcome, the operation was accompanied by instances of 
civilian mass killing. The Bukchon Incident, the largest event of civilian killing during the 
uprising, vividly demonstrates the systematic nature of violence perpetrated by government 
forces. On 17 January, 1949, the guerrillas ambushed a company from the Second Regiment, 
killing two soldiers. Immediately afterwards, the company entered nearby Bukchon, burned 
down 300 houses and indiscriminately murdered hundreds of villagers, including children and 
seniors, accusing them as enemy supporters.65 The killing only stopped when the battalion’s 
commander reached the scene and aimed a pistol at the company commander to get him to stop 
the killing.66 This signals a lack of solid command as even a junior officer's arbitrary decision 
could spur a civilian mass killing. The incident is one of numerous cases of systematic killing 
perpetrated during this phase. It is estimated that 6,527 civilians were killed by the government 
forces.67 
     Overall, our Jeju case study supports our theory. With moderate improvements in force 
integration between Phases 1 and 2, KC soldiers during the later operations were more 
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committed to the military objectives and successfully undermined the insurgent support base. 
Still lacking a sophisticated organisational capacity to regulate arbitrary use of violence, 
however, the constabulary’s more integrated, aggressive use of force transformed into 
significantly higher, systematic civilian casualties.  
 
Eleventh Division Operations 
A few months after the outbreak of the Korean War, the ROKA and the United Nations 
Command (UNC) forces faced fighting on two fronts: a conventional war against North Korea 
(and later Chinese forces), and partisan threat in the rear. Once the war commenced, the North 
Korean People’s Army (KPA) rapidly pierced through the outnumbered and outgunned ROKA 
defence lines and occupied most of the Korean peninsula.68 However, the situation was quickly 
reversed once 75,000 UNC forces had successfully landed in Inchon and regained control of the 
central region of the peninsula. By 28 September, 1950, a significant number of KPA soldiers 
initially deployed to the South were isolated inside the ROK territory.69  
     North Korea utilised these isolated forces to disrupt internal stability of the ROK as Kim Il-
Sung ordered them to ‘cut enemy supply line, assault enemy leadership, and expand liberated 
zones’.70 An estimated 10,000 stranded KPA soldiers and SKLP members based in Chiri 
Mountain area carried out guerrilla attacks.71 Even after the UNC forces advanced past the 38th 
parallel, South Korea did not have complete control over the southwestern region of the 
peninsula. Out of the 338 local police posts in Jeolla Province, 258 were still controlled by the 
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guerrillas in late October 1950, and those under the ROK control could barely defend their 
surrounding areas.72  
     To suppress the remaining communist-occupied zones in the south, the ROKA created the 
Eleventh Division. From 4 October, 1950 to 30 March, 1951, the Ninth, Thirteenth and 
Twentieth Regiments of this division conducted operations in South Gyeongsang, North and 
South Jeolla Provinces, respectively. Roughly 10,000 army and police personnel were 
committed, approximately equaling guerrilla strength. As in Jeju, the Eleventh Division 
primarily relied on civilian displacement tactics.73 Soldiers relocated the population and crops to 
government-controlled areas and burned down houses to deny guerrilla sanctuary.74 According to 
available materials, the division did not engage in civil operations nor were American military 
advisors involved. The division conducted operation in 33 counties and cities, approximately 
18,000 km2. 
     The overall force integration of the Eleventh Division was moderate (MEDIUM). First, 
command structure showed notable improvements, as Gen. Duk-sin Choi was in charge for the 
full duration of the campaign. Likewise, the lower-level units maintained a unified command 
structure unlike the units in Phase 2 of Jeju operations.  
     In terms of monitoring, division officers failed to closely supervise their units due to a lack of 
commitment and the size of the operation zones. In his memoir, Gen. Choi described his division 
as ‘second class’, expressing his disinterest in counter-guerrilla operations.75 Mid-ranking 
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officers showed similar sentiments. The commander of the Ninth Regiment, Col. Ik-kyeong Oh, 
did not show up at massacre sites even after the atrocities that his troops committed became a 
nation-wide scandal.76 In an internal document circulated in January 1951, the operations chief 
of the division reported that many officers often stayed far behind the action zone to avoid direct 
engagement. Moreover, many made deliberate efforts to evade supervision by cutting 
communications with headquarters.77 Given the relatively large area covered, the Eleventh 
division had to conduct operations in a dispersed fashion, further undermining the commander’s 
ability to supervise. 
      The level of personnel quality was intermediate. After undergoing an extensive anti-
communist campaign in 1949, the ROKA did not experience serious loyalty issues due to poor 
recruitment processes.78 The division, however, had problems in training and combat experience. 
The army’s nascent training system collapsed with the outbreak of the Korean War, and many 
newly conscripted soldiers were ill-prepared prior to deployment.79 Indeed, Gen Choi admitted 
that the hastily deployed division suffered from a lack of discipline.80 For example, the use and 
maintenance of crew-served weapons, such as mortars and machine guns, were limited, 
sometimes simply because they were deemed too heavy to carry.81 
     Evidence suggests that the operation successfully weakened the guerrillas. According to the 
People’s Guerrillas in South Gyeongsang Province’s internal report, the group lost all the three 
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townships under its control by the end of March 1951.82 Groups in the Jeolla region also lost 
most of the liberated areas during this period. The Communists readily admitted that their 
activity was ‘extremely weak except for the defensive struggle’ during the Eleventh Division’s 
operations.83 Further capitulation or desertion followed due to severe weather and food shortage. 
Consequently, guerrillas had to sneak into the police-protected villages and coerce civilians for 
supplies, a plan that was risky and exacerbated their relationship with the general population. 
     Regarding civilian costs, numerous instances of systematic killing, on top of widespread 
materially and sexually-driven violence, were perpetrated during the operation.84 A police chief 
who assisted the operation bitterly called the Eleventh Division ‘the public harm division’, as 
some units ‘acted as if their primary task was to pose threats to civilians and the local 
government’.85 In addition, there were many instances in which civilians who failed to leave 
their houses on time or keep pace with the soldiers were simply shot.86 Moreover, the troops 
attempted to murder entire villages in multiple localities during the operation. Overall, 
approximately 2,500 civilians were identified as victims of the Eleventh Division by the TRC 
and the government council on the incidents in Geochang and neighboring counties.87 
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     One example of this systematic killing is the Geochang Massacre. On 5 February, 1951, the 
Third Battalion, Ninth Regiment, reclaimed Shinwon-myeon in Geochang County under a 
regiment operation order to shoot ‘civilians in the hands of the enemy’.88 After deploying 
defence personnel, the battalion left without further action.89 As the guerrillas returned to attack 
the township a few days later, however, the battalion commander was scolded by the regiment 
commander and tasked with ‘addressing the situation’.90 This ended with the battalion 
perpetrating systematic mass killing in multiple villages in Geochang, Sancheong, and Hamyang 
Counties.91 In Shinwon-myeon alone, 719 civilians were killed, including hundreds of children 
and seniors.92 To cover up this arbitrary killing, the regiment falsely equated casualty numbers to 
guerrillas killed in its after-action report to division headquarters.93 This mass killing soon 
provoked a nation-wide scandal, resulted in the replacements of Ministers of National Defense, 
Internal Affairs, and Justice, and abruptly ended the operation itself in early April 1951. 
     Again, the second case study is consistent with our thesis. As with Phase 2 Jeju operations, 
soldiers of the moderately-integrated Eleventh Division successfully damaged the support base 
of the guerrillas in Chiri Mountain. However, due to the various internal problems within the 
division, such as poor supervision and inexperienced personnel, the division headquarters was 
unable to control the systematic killing of 2,500 civilians perpetrated by its units.  
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Task Force Paik 
Once the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA) intervened and pushed back the UNC 
forces with a series of offensives, the Korean War evolved into a stalemate by mid-1951. While 
the conventional fighting gradually subsided around the 38th parallel, approximately 4,000 
remaining guerrillas in the south were reinvigorated under the command of Hyun-sang Lee, an 
experienced guerrilla leader dispatched from the North during the CPVA’s Spring Offensives. 
New weapons were distributed and most of the existing guerrillas were reorganised under his 
command.94 The guerrillas launched large-scale attacks on nearby areas with new-found vigor, 
continuously disrupting the ROKA’s supply routes.95 
     It is within this context that the Korean National Assembly voted for military operations to 
restore internal order. On 16 November, 1951, Task Force Paik was created to conduct Operation 
Ratkiller. With 30,000 military and police personnel, the taskforce enjoyed favorable balance of 
power (7.5:1).96 The US Military provided reconnaissance planes and radio broadcasting 
equipment.97 The two divisions committed for the mission were the ROKA’s Capital Division 
(Gen. Yo-chan Song) and the Eighth Division (Gen. Young-hi Choi). The primary objective of 
the operation was to ‘eliminate domestic Communist guerrillas and destroy all of their 
supplies’.98 The taskforce also conducted psychological and civic operations.99 
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     From the onset, the two divisions in coordination with police forces completely encircled the 
Chiri Mountain and conducted ‘rabbit-hunting’ style mop-up operations all the way up to the top. 
Civilians were relocated to nearby ‘collective villages (jeonryak-chon)’, which were doubly 
fortified with stone and bamboo walls and guarded by ROKA or police forces.100 All crops and 
livestock were put into collective storage at night, and each household was rationed a daily 
portion the next morning. Taskforce units seized or destroyed concealed crops found in operation 
zones via information collected from captives.101 Civilians in deep mountain areas, mostly either 
communist sympathisers or those who fled from potential abuses by government forces, were 
captured and sent to detention camps in Namwon and Gwangju.102 The taskforce operated in 16 
ROK-controlled counties and cities, about 9,750 km2 areas of land.  
     Force integration of the taskforce was high in every aspect (HIGH). Regarding the command 
structure, both army divisions and the auxiliary police battalions were under the official 
command of Gen. Sun-yup Paik103 without any leadership changes throughout.104 Specifically, 
Gen. Paik was deeply involved in the formation of the taskforce and detailed its operational plans 
with the support of Gen. James Van Fleet, commander of the US Eighth Army and UN forces. 
     Second, Paik and the other senior commanders exerted considerable effort to monitor their 
units in action by using reconnaissance planes. Troops were ordered to carry red identification 
panels, which made monitoring easier aboard planes in the snow-covered mountains. Due to 
such efforts, the long-standing problem of false after-action reports concocted by junior officers 
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was largely corrected.105 Third, by this stage soldiers were far more experienced in comparison to 
the previous campaigns. The Capital and Eighth Divisions had gained considerable combat 
experience at the frontlines and in the Chiri Mountain areas, respectively. 
     Many former guerrillas recall Task Force Paik’s operations as the most effective campaign 
launched against them.106 Due to the draining-the-sea tactics employed, insurgents who survived 
the operations suffered from severe supply shortage and oftentimes risked their lives to collect 
food from nearby towns.107 As many former insurgents recollect, such difficulties led to 
desperation and forced them to rely more on coercive measures, which eventuated in a worsened 
relationship with the population base.108 Lacking consistent supply bases, most guerrillas had to 
walk and sleep on snowy mountains without proper shelter or clothing for extended periods of 
time.109 Thus, securing food and other daily supplies became the top priority for the insurgents’ 
military wings rather than disturbing the ROK governance structure.110 
     At the same time, the counter-guerrilla forces were able to relocate civilians less violently. 
Gen. Paik directed that ‘no individual or unit should fire at anyone who was not in the act of 
resisting’.111 A police commander who participated in the operations described the campaign as 
‘systematic, modernized, and well-disciplined’.112 The number of reported cases of civilian 
killing dropped considerably; the Pan-National Committee report, which records 669 alleged 
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events of civilian killing, does not include a single case perpetrated by the taskforce.113 Similarly, 
a report by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission include six victimised civilians during 
forced displacement but no systematic killings perpetrated by the taskforce.114  
     This does not necessarily mean that the taskforce’s operations were conducted without 
violence, as many civilians in detention camps died in harsh conditions.115 In addition, it is still 
possible that the ROKA’s war record includes civilian victims who were falsely reported as 
guerrillas killed.116 Yet, based on the available evidence, it is clear that the frequency and scale 
of the killings perpetrated by the ROKA dropped significantly compared to the previous 
operations. 
     As suggested by our theory, the operation conducted by the highly integrated Task Force Paik 
was both militarily successful and less violent. Utilising strong organisational capacity, 
commanders of the taskforce were able to trace the process of the operation in greater detail and 
ultimately reduce the use of arbitrary violence by its soldiers.  
 
<INSERT TABLE II HERE> 
 
Conclusion  
Our case studies of the South Korean campaign demonstrate that implementation of civilian 
displacement tactics can vary dramatically depending on the integration of security forces 
conducting the operations (see Table II). Specifically, a unified and durable command structure, 
the commanding officers’ efforts to actively monitor operational developments, and high-level of 
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qualification of personnel gained via solid recruitment, training, and combat experience were 
factors that led to the successful cutting-off of the insurgents from the population base with 
reduced civilian costs. When these factors are partially developed, however, relocation 
operations potentially result in systematic violence against civilians, as demonstrated by the Jeju 
Phase 2 and Eleventh Division operations. These two operations were significantly more 
successful in undermining the guerrilla support when compared to the Phase 1 Jeju operation, yet 
with an overwhelmingly greater numbers of civilian deaths.  
     Other rival explanations do not demonstrate strong explanatory power. Regarding the balance 
of power between the COIN forces and guerrillas, and the geographical scope of operations, the 
government forces committed to the Jeju Uprising were in the most favorable conditions, facing 
poorly armed pockets of guerrilla resistance in the smallest land areas. However, the later 
operation by the Eleventh Division was more, or at least equally, successful on military grounds 
despite being in a relatively disadvantageous position. Civil operations similarly do not offer 
strong plausibility. Although the amnesty program were used during phase two of the Jeju 
operation and later by Task Force Paik, the former was merely utilised by the insurgents as an 
opportunity for aggression while the latter was largely dismissed as propaganda. Lastly, the 
involvement of American military advisors cannot explain the outcomes of our cases. While US 
advisors were deeply involved in both Jeju operations and the Operation Ratkiller, the 
consequences varied dramatically.  
     While additional analysis is required to further establish the causal mechanism between force 
integration, military outcomes, and civilian killings during displacement operations, our research 
holds several implications. First, our research contributes to the emerging scholarship on civilian 
displacement. Despite recent consideration of displacement tactics as a distinct type of political 
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violence, few have focused on the degree of violence. Given that civilian displacement continues 
to be a popular COIN tool in the post-Cold War era, analyzing the dynamics of violence can help 
us better prepare for humanitarian efforts in ongoing and future conflicts.  
     In addition, this study suggests a counterintuitive, non-linear relationship between force 
integration and the level of violence against civilians during relocation operations. While an 
improvement to intermediate level of force integration can lead to a more militarily successful 
outcome, it can also provoke a greater scale of violence against civilians. This can be a serious 
challenge for a burgeoning army that is unable to invest considerable resources to further 
improve its organisational capacity. Following our research, we recommend the commanders of 
newly developing armies to distribute their limited organisational capabilities wisely and plan 
operations moderately. As our Eleventh Division case study demonstrates, even a militarily 
successful operation can be disrupted if it generates civilian costs that ultimately damage the 
legitimacy of the government. 
     Moreover, our findings highlight the importance of effective oversight during civilian 
displacement operations, as COIN is a context in which soldiers perceive considerable threats 
from civilians and war crimes can be easily covered up. Contrary to recent studies that have 
emphasized the autonomy of lower-level units,117 we suggest that autonomy without a solid 
command could be risky from both military and humanitarian perspectives. This is more 
pronounced for security forces that are not at the level of advanced military organisations, 
especially indigenous forces of newly-established countries. Relatedly, we urge caution in 
 
117 John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: 
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outsourcing civilian-related operations to private companies as similar principal-agent problems 
may arise. 
     Lastly, our in-depth study of an underexplored case contributes empirically and policy-wise to 
the study of the Korean peninsula. Empirically, despite being one of the more successful COIN 
cases of the early Cold War period, the South Korean case, especially ROKA Eleventh Division 
operations, has rarely received rigorous academic attention compared to those in Greece, the 
Philippines, and Malaysia.118 As such, our analysis is one of the first attempts to systematically 
address counter-guerrilla operations from a micro-level perspective as well as examine neglected 
civilian massacres perpetrated before and during the Korean War period. In terms of policy, our 
study provides broad lessons to military planners and civilian policy-makers in preparing for 
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